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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-BRIEF INVESTIGA-
TIONAL STOPS-DRUG COURIER PROFILES-The United States Su-
preme Court has held that drug courier profiles may be utilized by
law enforcement agents to demonstrate that a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity exists in order to justify their brief investiga-
tive stop of an individual for questioning within Constitutional
parameters.
United States v. Sokolow, _ U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
Early in the evening of July 25, 1984, Andrew Sokolow was
stopped by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
shortly after his arrival at the Honolulu International Airport from
Miami.' One piece of Sokolow's luggage, a Louis Vuitton tote, was
found to contain 1.063 grams of cocaine.2 Prior to stopping the re-
spondent, DEA agents had determined that:
1. Sokolow had paid $2,100 in cash for two round-trip tickets from a stack
of $20 bills estimated by the ticket agent to contain approximately $4,000.'
2. He and a female companion had stayed in Miami about 48 hours, with
the flight time to and from Honolulu and Miami totaling 20 hours."
3. Miami is a known source city for illegal drugs.5
4. The name under which Sokolow purchased his ticket did not match the
name under which his telephone was listed.'
1. United States v. Sokolow, -U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). Also stopped was
Janet Norian, Sokolow's female roommate, who had accompanied respondent on his trip to
and from Miami. Id. at 4402.
2. 109 S. Ct. at 1584. All four pieces of Sokolow's luggage were sniffed by two narcotics
detection dogs. The dogs "alerted", or indicated by their behavior that they detected the
smell of an illegal substance, to two pieces of this luggage. Search warrants were obtained
for both bags. When searched, only the Louis Vuitton tote appeared to contain cocaine al-
though cocaine residue was discovered later in the other bag as well. Id.
3. 109 S. Ct. at 1583. Respondent purchased his tickets at a United Airlines counter in
the Honolulu Airport. He handed the ticket agent a large stack of $20 bills, from which the
agent took $2,100. The agent observed that the stack was depleted by about half and that
respondent seemed nervous. The ticket agent informed Officer John McCarthy of the Hono-
lulu Police Department's airport task force of Sokolow's large cash purchase. Brief for the
United States at 3, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)(No. 87-1295).
4. 109 S. Ct. at 1583.
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581
(1989)(No.87-1295). The DEA agents who questioned respondent testified at an evidentiary
hearing that "Miami is the granddaddy source city for cocaine." Id. at 13.
6. Brief for the United States at 3-4. Respondent bought his tickets in the names An-
drew Kray and Janet Norian. After being tipped off by the United Airlines agent, Officer
McCarthy checked the home phone number Sokolow had provided and learned that it was
listed to a Karl Herman. There was no Hawaiian telephone listing for Andrew Kray. When
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5. Neither respondent nor his companion checked any of their four pieces of
luggage on either flight.
7
6. Sokolow appeared to be nervous throughout his trip.'
7. Respondent was about 25 years old and wore a black jumpsuit with a lot
of gold jewelry during both flights."
Four DEA agents intercepted Sokolow and his companion, Janet
Norian, as they were hailing a cab outside the airport.10 Agent
Richard Kempshall showed the respondent his credentials, then
guided him back onto the sidewalk.11 When asked to produce his
ticket and identification, Sokolow replied that he had neither." He
told the agents his name was "Sokolow" but that his ticket had
been purchased in his mother's maiden name of "Kray."' 3 Both
respondent and Norian were taken to the airport DEA office where
their luggage was "searched" by Donker, a dog trained to sniff out
narcotics.' 4 Donker alerted to respondent's brown shoulder bag.' 5
At this point, Sokolow was placed under arrest and informed of his
Miranda rights.' 6 He made no statement.' 7 Agents obtained a
search warrant for the brown shoulder bag but discovered no illicit
drugs.' 8 However, the bag did contain an assortment of papers
McCarthy called Herman's number, the ticket agent identified the recorded message as be-
ing in Andrew Kray's voice. Id.
7. 109 S. Ct. at 1583.
8. Brief for the United States at 3-4. The ticket agent had told Officer McCarthy of
Sokolow's nervous conduct. Narcotics agents during his layover in the Los Angeles airport
on his return flight also reported his nervous mannerisms, such as "looking all around the
waiting area." Id.
9. 109 S. Ct. at 1583.
10. Id. at 1584. After deplaning, Sokolow and Norian carried their bags directly to the
ground transportation area and moved out into the street to flag down a taxi. Id.
11. Id. The agents denied having physical contact with Sokolow. The District Court
found respondent's claim that an agent had grabbed him "reasonably believable," observing
that the government had the burden of proof on this issue. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
4-5, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)(No. 87-1295).
12. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
13. Id. While in the airport DEA office, Sokolow also claimed that a man named
Marty, whom he had met on the beach, bought his tickets. Brief for the United States at 5.
14. 109 S. Ct. at 1584. Narcotics dogs are not permitted to perform their duties within
the public areas of the airport. Regarding the constitutionality of using trained dogs to de-
tect narcotics in airline passengers' luggage, the Supreme Court held in 1983 that such snif-
fing was not a search and so not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. United States v.
Place, 462 696 (1983).
15. 109 S. Ct. at 1584. In the affidavit for a warrant to search this bag, task force
officer McCarthy indicated that Donker had accurately alerted to the presence of narcotics
in luggage on hundreds of previous occasions and was a reliable narcotics detection dog.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5.
16. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
17. Id.
18. Id. A more complete examination later revealed cocaine residue. Petition for Writ
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linking respondent with the drug trade.1 9 Donker then sniffed the
remaining three pieces of luggage and this time alerted to a me-
dium-sized Louis Vitton bag. 20 As it was too late in the evening to
secure a second search warrant, respondent was allowed to leave,
but without his luggage. 21 The following morning, a second narcot-
ics detection dog confirmed Donker's alert to the Louis Vuitton
bag and a warrant to search this piece was sought and granted.2 2
Agents thereafter found 1.063 grams of cocaine inside the Louis
Vuitton bag.23
Based on the above evidence, Sokolow was indicted for violation
of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1),. and charged
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine.2" The District
Court denied respondent's motion to suppress the evidence pro-
duced by the airport searches, finding that Sokolow's detention by
DEA agents was supported by a reasonable suspicion that respon-
dent was presently engaged in drug trafficking. 5 Sokolow was con-
victed after entering a conditional plea of guilty.
26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the District Court's conviction, holding that the reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify respondent's detention by DEA
agents was not present.27 The majority opinion divided evidence
of Certiorari at 5.
19. 109 S. Ct. at 1584. Inside the bag were two round trip tickets for previous Hono-
lulu-Miami flights issued in the names Andrew Kray and James Wodehouse, along with
Miami hotel receipts matching these trips. Hand-written notes that appeared to be memos
of drug transactions also were found. The bag also held four safety deposit box keys and
respondent's personal address book listing the names of suspected drug traffickers. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6.
20. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
21. Id. Donker alerted to the second bag around 9:30 p.m., approximately three hours
after respondent had initially been approached by DEA agents. Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 6.
22. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
23. Id.
24. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) provides:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or possess with in-
tent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1970).
25. United States v. Sokolow, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1581 1584 (1989).
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3. Sokolow was sentenced to five years in
prison, followed by three years of parole. Id. at 3.
27. 109 S. Ct. at 1584. This was the second time the Court of Appeals heard this case,
and in both instances the Court concluded that respondent's stop was not supported by a
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. On the first hearing, the
Court examined separately each fact known by the agents to determine if it gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that respondent was transporting drugs. After the Supreme Court's
1990
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used to constitute reasonable suspicion into two types: evidence
descriptive of "ongoing criminal activity" and evidence descriptive
of the "personal characteristics" of drug traffickers.28 In the first
category, the Court of Appeals listed the use of an alias and eva-
sive behavior in an airport.29 In the second category, the Court
placed cash payment for tickets, nervousness, unchecked baggage,
unconventional dress, and a brief stay in a city notorious for its
drug trade.3 0 Foreseeing a danger in that the second category of
"personal characteristics" could be shared by drug traffickers and
innocent persons alike, the Court required that before any of these
last factors could be used to help accumulate reasonable suspicion,
there must also be evidence of "ongoing criminal activity" from the
first category.3 1 The Court further demanded that the government
show that this combination of evidence from both categories could
not also "describe the behavior of significant numbers of innocent
persons. '"32 The majority denied that the DEA agents had any evi-
dence of respondent's ongoing criminal activity3 and so, applying
its newly-enunciated, two-part test for reasonable suspicion, held
that Sokolow's detention was without justification and therefore
unconstitutional.
3 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 5 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, focused on the issue of whether the
DEA agents reasonably suspected that respondent was engaged in
criminal activity when they initially stopped him as he was leaving
the Honolulu airport. 36 The Court first cited Terry v. Ohio37 for its
decision in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the government petitioned for a
rehearing and argued that this individualized analysis of the factors leading to reasonable
suspicion was not in keeping with the "totality of the circumstances" analysis advocated by
Cortez. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-9.
28. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1584-85.
29. 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
30. 109 S. Ct. at 1585.
31. 109 S. Ct. at 1584-85.
32. Id. The Court of Appeals requested that this be proved by resort to "empirical
documentation" or "statistical evidence." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9.
33. 109 S. Ct. at 1585. Respondent's apparent use of an alias was discounted by the
Court of Appeals as evidence of ongoing criminal activity because "it is not unusual for
persons with different last names to share a common residence and telephone." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 9.
34. 109 S. Ct. at 1585.
35. Id.
36. Id. As Rehnquist stated, "our decision, then, turns on whether the agents had a
reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing when they encountered
him on the sidewalk." Id.
812 Vol. 28:809
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holding that law enforcement officers can stop and briefly detain
an individual for investigation if they have reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that crime may be afoot. 8 The ma-
jority then referred to previous decisions that posited that whether
or not reasonable suspicion existed could not be determined by re-
liance upon a mechanical checklist.39 Rather, the "totality of the
circumstances" of each stop by law enforcement officers must be
considered in evaluating its validity.40
The majority was critical of the two-part test formulated by the
Court of Appeals. The majority's first objection was that this test,
which required that at least one fact indicative of present criminal
activity be joined with those "personal characteristics" of drug
couriers, was in opposition to earlier opinions that had consistently
held there are no crisply defined criteria for reasonable suspicion.
The second, stronger objection of the majority was that the Court
of Appeals' classification of evidence into two categories attempted
to distinguish between evidence on the basis of its greater or lesser
probative value, evidence which the majority viewed to be of po-
tentially equal probative value.2 The majority's belief was that the
use of an alias and evasive movement through an airport, cited by
the Court of Appeals as classic omens of ongoing criminal activity,
"do not have the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by
the Court of Appeals."4 3 In addition, the majority opinion took aim
at the Court of Appeals' dismissal of those personal characteristics
frequently identified with drug traffickers as "merely probabilistic"
by pointing out that these factors can be highly probative as well.44
The majority stated that the Court of Appeals two-part test drew
too fine a line between the kinds of evidence whose probative value
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
38. Id. at 30. Reasonable suspicion is broadly defined in Terry as less than probable
cause but more than an inchoate hunch. Id. at 20-22.
39. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585. United States v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) is quoted
for its assertion that reasonable suspicion cannot be "readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules." Id at 232.
40. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585. This was the holding of United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S: 411 (1981).
41. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585. Again quoting from Cortez, "the process does not deal
with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Cortez, supra, note 40, at 418.
42. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586.
43. Id. The majority puts forth an example of "innocent" use of an alias as where a
newsworthy individual traveling to a hospital for an operation might wish to conceal his
identity. Id.
44. Id. The majority dryly avers that few Hawaiians would endure a 20-hour flight to
enjoy a scant 48 hours on the beaches of Miami during the month of July. Id.
1990
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differed only slightly, if at all."5
Similarly, the majority emphasized that a factor used to support
reasonable suspicion could be coincident with innocent behavior.46
This type of factor, the majority reasoned, could be considered
along with other factors to have made up the "totality of circum-
stances" from which reasonable suspicion may have arisen.4' The
majority opinion recalled that the facts of Terry set forth a num-
ber of separate, seemingly innocent acts that amounted to reasona-
ble suspicion only when viewed collectively by a seasoned police
officer.48 The majority, by referring in the footnotes to two recent
drug courier cases, Florida v. Royer49 and Reid v. Georgia,5" rati-
fied the principle that it is the total body of evidence in each in-
stance that must be reviewed in order to assess reasonable
suspicion.5
In Sokolow's case, the majority held that reasonable suspicion
was nonetheless valid if the personal characteristics and behavior
of Sokolow that originally brought him to the attention of DEA
agents were listed in a drug courier profile.52 The Court firmly as-
serted that "the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'pro-
file' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary
45. Id.
46. Id. The opinion quotes from Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), "there could, of
course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot." Id. at 441. The Court stated, however, that this was not such a
case.
47. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. The Court again harks back to Cortez for its hold-
ing that the whole picture must be taken into account in determining whether police have
sufficient cause to detain an individual. Id.
48. 109 S. Ct. at 1587. As the Court acknowledges, Terry involved "a series of acts,
each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investi-
gation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
49. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
50. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
51. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87. In Florida v. Royer, the police knew before stop-
ping defendant that (1) he was using an alias; (2) he paid cash for his ticket; (3) he was
traveling from Miami, a recognized distribution point of illicit narcotics; (4) he appeared to
be nervous; (5) his luggage tags bore only his name - no address or phone number. The
Court held that these factors led the police to reasonably suspect Royer to be engaged in
criminal activity. In Reid v. Georgia, the Court held that petitioner's stop by the DEA was
absent reasonable suspicion. At the time of the stop, the agent knew that (1) Reid's flight
originated in Ft. Lauderdale, a source city for cocaine; (2) Reid did not check any of his
luggage; (3) he arrived on an early morning flight, when police surveillance is presumed to
be thin; (4) it appeared Reid was trying to conceal the fact that he was traveling with an-
other. Id.
52. 109 S. Ct. at 1587. Rehnquist writes, "we do not agree with respondent that our
analysis is somehow changed by the agent's belief that his behavior was consistent with one
of the DEA's drug courier profiles." Id.
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significance."5
The opinion concluded by refusing to review the reasonableness
of the agents' detention of respondent based on whether the least
intrusive means available was used to confirm the drug agents' sus-
picions." Dicta in Florida v. Royer55 was interpreted as directing
that the period of detention during which an investigation is con-
ducted be as brief as possible, not as requiring that the least intru-
sive means of investigation be used. 6 The majority quite forcefully
stated that "the reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a
suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investiga-
tive techniques."" To find otherwise, the court feared, would inter-
fere with law enforcement's ability to take quick action and lead
the courts to second-guess police decisions. 8
In summation, the Supreme Court held that the DEA Agents
had a reasonable basis for suspecting that Sokolow was trafficking
in drugs on the facts presented, and therefore, their detention of
Sokolow passed Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 9
In his dissent, Justice Marshall began by warning that Fourth
Amendment rights can be subtly eroded if their application-even
to criminals-is ignored. 0 He claimed that by holding that the
DEA agents reasonably suspected Sokolow to be a drug trafficker,
and therefore subject to lawful detention, the Court "diminishes
the rights of all citizens to be secure in their persons." 1 Marshall
pointed out that the Fourth Amendment safeguards individual pri-
vacy and security by requiring that all seizures and searches be
supported by a showing of probable cause. 2 Referring to the rea-
sonable suspicion standard as deriving from probable cause, Mar-
shall limited the scope of reasonable suspicion to those situations
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
56. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587. Florida v. Royer reads, "the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time." 460 U.S. at 500.
57. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
58. Id. The majority cited the opinions in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531 (1985) and United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) as deriding this sec-
ond-guessing as unrealistic and harmful to effective law enforcement. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Justice Brennan joined this dissent, agreeing with Marshall that the circum-
stances of Sokolow's detention do not demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that he was en-
gaged in criminal activity. Id. at 1591.
61. 109 S. Ct. at 1587-88.
62. 109 S. Ct. at 1588.
1990 815
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necessitating immediate police action and where the resulting de-
tentions would be brief and would "fall short of being full-scale
searches and seizures. '6 3 Marshall argued that the mandate that
reasonable suspicion be grounded on "specific and articulable
facts" indicating that the individual is committing or about to
commit a crime deters police searches and seizures based on vague
stereotypes or other irrelevant factors. 4
Marshall believed that the facts adduced by the agents relevant
to Andrew Sokolow did not amount to reasonable suspicion.15 Mar-
shall contended that Sokolow was stopped solely because he fit the
drug courier profile, however variable the characteristics included
therein may have been.6 6 Castigating the "mechanistice application
of a formula of personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to
detain," Marshall predicted that the majority dccision would now
allow innocent citizens to be subjected to arbitrary police deten-
tions.6 7 The dissent cited Reid v. Georgia,e5 where eight members
of the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant's personification
of four characteristics contained in a drug courier profile was insuf-
ficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 9 The dissent
protested that the facts in Reid, where defendant tried to conceal
that he was traveling with another and even attempted to flee
when approached by DEA agents, implied criminal intent and ac-
tivity more so than the facts here.70 Justice Marshall maintained
that Sokolow's only manifestation of criminal involvement was his
nervousness, which in light of recent aircraft mishaps was not un-
63. Id. As examples of those exigent situations requiring on-the-spot police action,
Marshall lists "the need to stop ongoing crimes, to prevent imminent crimes, and to protect
law-enforcement officers in highly charged situations." Id.
64. Id. Marshall postulates that the reasonable suspicion standard guards against po-
lice harassment of those innocent citizens who just happen to look like criminals. Id.
65. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1589-90.
66. Id. Marshall details a number of cases where the suspects were said to have
evinced characteristics of the drug courier profile - but these characteristics differ from case
to case. Contrast United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980), where suspect was
among the last passengers to deplane, with United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (CA6
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), where suspect was the first to deplane. Or Brooks
v. United States, 444 U.S. 878 (1979), where suspect acted nervously, with United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (CA5), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977), where suspect
acted too calmly. Id.
67. Id. Marshall expresses his fear that "reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier
characteristics" risks "unwarranted police harassment and detention." Id.
68. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
69. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1589, citing Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
70. 109 S. Ct. at 1590.
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expected.71 Additionally, the dissent discounted the need for im-
mediate police action - where reasonable suspicion is a practical
exception to the probable cause standard - because Sokolow's
phone number was known.72 (Presumbly his home address could
thus have been ascertained and continued investigation made
possible.)
The dissent closed by praising the probity of the Court of Ap-
peals' decision affirming the "Fourth Amendment principle that
law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect a person of crim-
inal activity before they can detain him. 'v3 As a final note of dis-
agrement, Justice Marshall alleged in a footnote that the reasona-
bleness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demanded that
searches be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible,
which he implied was not done in Sokolow.74
The Fourth Amendment promises protection of an individual's
privacy and security by proclaiming that,
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.7"
Throughout the 1800's and for much of the 1900's, this amend-
ment was interpreted by judicial decision and dicta as stringently
requiring that any government intrusion amounting to a search or
seizure where the individual had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy had to be supported by probable cause, with or without a
warrant. 76 Only the existence of probable cause by law enforcement
officers to believe a crime had been committed, was being commit-
ted, or was about to be committed in the case of a seizure, or to
believe contraband would be found in the case of a search, sufficed
71. Id. Alluding to "plane crashes, near-collisions, and air terrorism," the dissent con-
cludes, "there are manifold and good reasons for being agitated while awaiting a flight...
that have nothing to do with one's involvement in a criminal endeavor." Id.
72. Id. Marshall suggests that it is unreasonable to believe Sokolow would have been
beyond further investigation once he had departed the Honolulu airport. Id.
73. 109 S. Ct. at 1591.
74. Id. Citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985), Marshall asserted that,
"the manner in which a search is carried out ... is a highly important index of reasonable-
ness under Fourth Amendment doctrine." Id.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76. The Court held in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) that the Fourth
Amendment affords protection only when the individual has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy; that is, an expectation recognized by society. Id. at 350-354. Also see Florida v. Royer,




At the start of the 20th century, the exclusionary rule was fash-
ioned as a deterrent of unreasonable searches and seizures. In
1914, Weeks v. United States78 established the rule that evidence
obtained through an unlawful search or seizure by federal officials
was to be excluded from consideration in criminal prosecutions at
the federal level.79 Finding that the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to restrict the power and authority of federal officials,
the United States Supreme Court in Weeks reasoned that searches
and seizures conducted on a federal level in violation of an individ-
ual's constitutionally-guaranteed rights should not be tolerated.80
To that end, evidence obtained pursuant to illegal searches and
seizures by federal officers was excluded from admission in federal
proceedings.81 Six years later, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 2 the Supreme. Court resoundingly affirmed the
Weeks decision by holding that any knowledge federal officers ac-
quired during their perusal of evidence unlawfully seized, as well
as the evidence itself, "shall not be used at all."8 3 The Supreme
Court, in Elkins v. United States,84 broadened the Weeks rule to
77. See Justice Douglas' historical analysis of probable cause in his dissent in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1968). Quoting Douglas, "the infringement on personal liberty of
any 'seizure' of a person can only be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment if we require
the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize him. Id. at 38.
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. Id. at 392.
80. Id.
81. 232 U.S. at 398.
82. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Silverthornes were arrested and while detained, their
business offices were searched without warrant by federal officials who removed books and
papers. Although these materials were returned under court order upon defendants' peti-
tion, federal officials made copies of these records. Based on information contained in the
copies, a new indictment was issued and the Silverthornes were subpoenaed to produce the
originals. When they refused, the district court found them in contempt, jailed the son, and
fined the company. The Supreme Court reversed the contempt citation and held that the
only way the government could use the information it had purloined from the illegally-
seized records was if the same facts could be documented through other means. Id.
83. Id. at 392.
84. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). State officers searched Elkins' home for obscene materials
pursuant to a search warrant restricted to these items. Finding no obscene films or photos,
the officers confiscated wiretapping equipment instead. The state court suppressed the ad-
mission of this illegally-obtained evidence and dismissed the state indictment. Federal of-
ficers obtained the wiretapping paraphernalia and brought a federal indictment against El-
kins. Upon motion to suppress, the federal district court refused to exclude the wiretapping
evidence because federal officers had not been involved in the unlawful search and seizure.
The Supreme Court reasoned that in order to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment, illegally-obtained evidence must be inadmissible in federal court regardless of
who seized it. Id.
Vol. 28:809
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exclude from admission in federal criminal trials evidence obtained
by state officers in violation of Fourth Amendment protections. 5
The majority reasoned that to allow the admission in federal court
of unlawfully seized evidence solely because it was obtained as a
result of state, rather than federal, action would constitute judicial
subterfuge.8 6
One year later, the United States Supreme Court expanded the
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence acquired pursuant
to illegal searches and seizures by state and local officers intro-
duced in state criminal trials.8 ' The majority opinion in Mapp v.
Ohioas noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed for this utilization of the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures against the
states.8 " Through application of the exclusionary rule today, any
evidence obtained as a result of searches or seizures carried out
without probable cause, or outside one of the exceptions that has
since been excised from Fourth Amendment protection,9 ° is ex-
cluded from introduction at criminal trial. This suppression of
tainted evidence is recognized as an effective means of inhibiting
searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment.91 Up
until the late 1960's, any seizure performed without a basis in
probable cause was deemed by the courts to be unreasonable - an
arbitrary, unjustified government invasion of an individual's con-
stitutional rights. 9 More to the point, any evidence gathered as a
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id.
87. Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. 376 U.S. 643 (1961). State authorities tried to enter Mapp's home in order to ques-
tion a man they believed to be inside. Mapp refused to allow them to enter without a war-
rant. The officers returned later that day to forcibly enter Mapp's residence. When she de-
manded to be shown a warrant, the officers rapidly waved a piece of paper in the air and
then proceeded to seize obscene materials. At state court, no warrant was ever produced, the
"lewd and lascivious" materials seized were admitted as evidence and Mapp was convicted.
The Supreme Court held that illegally-seized evidence would not be admissable in federal or
state courts. Id.
89. Id. at 660.
90. Although probable cause is the common denominator of all reasonable searches
and seizures, the following kinds of searches and seizures have been deemed to be outside
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment: (1) where consent of the parties has
been obtained; (2) where exigent circumstances demand immediate action; (3) where weap-
ons or contraband are in plain view; (4) where a search is conducted incident to a lawful
arrest. 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures §§ 37-59 (1964).
91. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Terry, put it this way, "the rule
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
92. See Justice Douglas' sharp dissent in Terry where he decries the newly-announced
1990
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result of the unlawful seizure could be suppressed at trial. 3
With its decision in Terry v. Ohio94 in 1968, however, the Su-
preme Court created a narrow exception to the long-ingrained
principle that only probable cause could legitimate the seizure of a
citizen. A police officer with thirty-nine years' experience observed
Terry and a companion alternately walk up and down a city block
six times each, pausing to look in the same store window on each
pass.9 5 The two then walked a few blocks away where they con-
ferred with a third man who had previously spoken with them in
the midst of their reconnaisance9 Believing a stickup of the
surveilled store was imminent, the officer approached the group,
made some inquiries, and then quickly grabbed Terry and patted
down his outer garments for weapons. 7 He discovered a gun.98
Moving all three into a nearby store, the patrolman patted down
the other two men and discovered another weapon.9 9 At trial,
Terry's motion to suppress the admission of the gun as evidence
was denied and he was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon.1 °° The state appeals court affirmed and the state Supreme
Court refused to hear an appeal, claiming no constitutional ques-
tion was presented."'
Granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that
when a police officer personally observes behavior that leads him
to the reasonable suspicion, in light of his experience, that the per-
son observed may be involved in criminal activity and may pose a
present danger to the officer or to the public, a brief detention for
questioning may be made as well as a carefully limited search of
standard of reasonable suspicion because of its lack of certainty and deep roots of probable
cause. He laments the enunciation of this "lesser" standard and predicts dire consequences
for individual liberty and security. In detailing the history of probable cause in this country,
Douglas states, "police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches
without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the
constitutional standard of probable cause." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1968).
93. Id. at 12-13.
94. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
95. 392 U.S. at 6.
96. Id.
97. 392 U.S. at 5-6. During this frisk, Officer McFadden felt a gun in Terry's left
breast pocket but was unable to remove it while Terry wore the overcoat. McFadden took
Terry's coat off him as he herded the three men into the store. Id. at 7.
98. Id.
99. Id. McFadden placed his hands under the outer garments of just the two men on
whom he had felt a weapon during the frisk. Id.
100. 392 U.S. at 7-8.
101. 392 U.S. at 8. The appeals court decision can be found at State v. Terry, 5 Ohio
App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966).
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outer clothing for weapons. 02 Any weapons discovered were ad-
missable as evidence.103 The Court's decision in Terry explicitly
authorized the "stop and frisk" based on a reasonable suspicion by
a law enforcement officer that criminal activity was afoot.' 0 Proba-
ble cause was no longer necessary to ensure the constitutionality of
any seizure by police. 05 Provided the detainment was brief, based
on a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot, and confined to the
purpose of the stop, 0 6 the Fourth Amendment would not be
violated.
Although dispensing with the necessity of probable cause for this
particular kind of seizure, the Terry Court commented that the
reasonableness of the detention must still be ascertained in order
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures."' The Court reiterated that assessing
the reasonableness of the government intrusion involved balancing
the government's need for the intrusion, be it search or seizure,
against the citizen's constitutionally protected interest in main-
taining his privacy and security.'08 While acknowledging the gov-
ernment's heavy stake in crime prevention and effective law en-
102. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. The Supreme Court took care to specifically describe
the factors occasioning this constitutionally approved detention:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
.be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used . . .
Id.
103. 392 U.S. at 31.
104. 392 U.S. at 30-31.
105. 392 U.S. at 27. The Terry Court rejected "the contention that a policeman
needed to have probable cause for an arrest in order for a 'stop and frisk' to be reasonable."
Id.
106. 392 U.S. at 25-27. Presaging the Royer decision, the majority in Terry made the
point that the search must be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissable," quoting from Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967). The majority enumerated a number of cases where a search, though constitutionally
valid at its inception, became unlawful as a result of "its intolerable intensity and scope."
392 U.S. at 17-19.
107. 392 U.S. at 20-21.
108. Id. Chief Justice Warren borrows a phrase from another recent decision when he
asserts that there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-537 (1967). 392 U.S. at 21.
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forcement, the court also recognized the right of the individual to
be secure from arbitrary police seizures based on mere whims or
hunches. 10 9 Therefore, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the major-
ity, directed that the police officer, in order to bring this seizure
within Fourth Amendment strictures, must be able to point to
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts" would lead a reasonable person to sus-
pect that crime was afoot.110 Furthermore, the majority pointed
out that these "specific facts" and "rational inferences" were to be
viewed in light of the officer's on-the-job experience.' After all,
the Court said, "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in
itself, . . . taken together warranted further investigation" when
observed by a seasoned police officer." 2 Though establishing but a
limited exception to the probable cause standard for lawful
seizures, the Terry Court took a huge leap in approving a brief
investigatory stop for the purpose of questioning where a reasona-
ble suspicion existed based on the officer's observations and
experience.
1 3
Terry's reach was broadened in 1972 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Adams v. Williams."4 In Adams, a police officer was
told by an informant that an individual in a nearby car was selling
narcotics and had a gun tucked into his pants."' The officer ap-
proached the car, addressed some inquiries to the occupant, then
reached through the open window and grabbed the gun, which was
not visible."' The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, rejected the argument that reasonable suspicion could
109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-25. In conceding the large stake the government has in
being able to stop and search armed individuals, the majority acknowledged the long history
of violence in the U.S. and reported on the number of police officers killed in action during
the years 1960-1966. The majority also admitted the sanctity of the individual's rights to
privacy and security granted by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
110. 392 U.S. at 21. The majority believed that by requiring the stop and search to be
based on "narrowly drawn authority," the individual's Fourth Amendment rights would be
protected. 392 U.S. at 27.
111. 392 U.S. at 30.
112. 392 U.S. at at 22. In fact, the Court opined that "it would have been poor police
work indeed" if the experienced Officer McFadden had failed to become suspicious of the
trio as a result of observing their behavior. Id. at 23.
113. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
114. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The majority in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, a later
case, grants Adams' expansion of the limited opening permitted by Terry by commenting
that "we elaborated on Terry in Adams v. Williams." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975).
115. Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-146.
116. Id.
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be based only on the officer's own observations and held that an
unverified informant's tip could possess enough reliability, as here,
to justify a stop. 117 Refusing to distinguish among the different
source of information used by an officer in arriving at a reasonable
suspicion, the Court asserted that "a brief stop of a suspicious in-
dividual, . . . to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.""' 8
Reasonable suspicion was no longer limited to the application of
the police officer's experience to his own observations; information
received from others linking an individual to criminal activity
could now be considered in a reasonable suspicion
determination."19
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce2 ° involved the stop of a vehicle
near the Mexican border by the Border Patrol. Echoing Terry, the
majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, held that border
agents on roving patrol could stop vehicles "only if they are aware
of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from
those facts" amounting to a reasonable suspicion that the car's oc-
cupants are illegal aliens.' 2' The majority opinion cited Terry and
Adams as establishing "that in appropriate circumstances the
Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited 'search' or 'seizure'
on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to search
for contraband or evidence of crime."' 22 Taking a cue from Adams,
the majority asserted that a variety of circumstantial evidence was
relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion123 and faulted
the border agents for relying on just one factor: that the car's occu-
pants appeared to be Mexicans.' 2' As in Terry, the Court in
Brignoni-Ponce alluded to the sizable government interest in-
volved, in this case that of alleviating the illegal immigrant prob-
lem, as it evaluated the reasonableness of the government intru-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Annotation, The Law Enforcement Officer's Authority, under Federal Constitu-
tion, to "Stop and Frisk" Persons - Supreme Court Cases, 32 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1988).
120. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
121. 422 U.S. at 880.
122. 422 U.S. at 881.
123. 422 U.S. at 885.
124. 422 U.S. at 885-86. As Justice Powell put it, "In this case the officers relied on a
single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the oc-
cupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the
three occupants were aliens." Id.
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sion."2 5 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas observed that
this was the first case, since Terry established the reasonable sus-
picion standard, in which such a stop had been declared invalid
under the Fourth Amendment.12
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court heard a series of cases, all
dealing with airport stops of individuals suspected by law enforce-
ment agents of transporting illicit drugs.2 7 Each of the individuals
detained for questioning, and subsequently discovered to be carry-
ing narcotics, attracted attention initially because he or she
demonstrated certain behaviors that were part of a drug courier
profile used by police to identify possible drug traffickers. 128 In
every case, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a Terry-
type stop as well as the introduction at trial of evidence seized as a
result of a search in connection with this permissible intrusion. 29
In United States v. Mendenhall,"0 respondent was a young wo-
man who had been stopped and questioned by DEA agents in a
Detroit airport.1"' DEA agents initially chose to approach Menden-
hall because her conduct matched that described in a drug courier
profile. 32 Upon receiving unsatisfactory answers to their inquiries,
which heightened their suspicion, the agents asked respondent to
accompany them to the airport DEA office, where she consented to
a search of her purse and person.'33 A consensual search shortly
125. 422 U.S. at 879. The Court cited numerous statistics, all indicating that Mexican
aliens constituted the highest proportion of illegal immigrants. Quoting from the INS An-
nual Reporter,,the opinion reported that in 1970, "80%" of the deportable aliens arrested
were from Mexico." INS Ann. Rep. 95 (1970). By 1974, that percentage had increased to
94%. INS Ann. Rep. 94 (1974).
126. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 890. Justice Douglas observed that, in fact, "since
Terry we have granted review of a case applying the test only once, in Adams v. Williams,
• . . where the Court found the standard satisfied." Id.
127. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at 12, United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir.)(No. 87-1295).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
131. Id. at 547.
132. 446 U.S. at 547 n.1. Agents attached significance to these facts: Mendenhall ar-
rived from Los Angeles, the source city of most of Detroit's heroin; she was the last passen-
ger to disembark; she "appeared to be very nervous"; she visually scanned the entire waiting
room and seemed to "ID" the agents; she then bypassed the baggage claim area even though
she had checked some pieces; and she purchased a ticket from another airline for a flight
out of Detroit although she already had a ticket. Id.
133. 446 U.S. at 547-548. The agents identified themselves as federal law enforcement
officers and asked Mendenhall to produce her ticket and some identification. Her driver's
license bore the name Sylvia Mendenhall while the plane ticket was in the name of Annette
Ford. When asked to explain the discrepancy, Mendenhall replied that she "just felt like
824
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thereafter revealed that respondent had two packages of heroin
hidden in her clothing.""4 The district court denied respondent's
motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin as evidence,
finding that all aspects of the seizure and search were constitu-
tional. 3 5 Mendenhall was convicted of possession of narcotics with
intent to distribute.' In reversing Mendenhall's conviction, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 137 sole explanation was that the
case was undistinguishable from United States v. McCaleb'38
where the Sixth Circuit had earlier refused to recognize that rea-
sonable suspicion existed where the government relied heavily on a
drug courier profile. 39 In McCaleb, the Court of Appeals expressly
criticized the fact that drug courier characteristics could be exhib-
ited by innocent persons as well as by those trafficking in drugs.' 0
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals' judgment, with five of the justices agreeing
that the respondent's detention posed no constitutional problem.'"
Mendenhall marks the first case heard by the Supreme Court
where a drug courier profile served to substantiate the presence of
reasonable suspicion. 42 In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell
commented that trained law enforcement personnel are adept at
ferreting out criminal activity in what otherwise appears to be in-
nocent behavior.1
4 3
Just one month after Mendenhall, the Supreme Court, in Reid
v. Georgia,'" overturned petitioner Reid's conviction for posses-
using that name." Respondent said she had spent only two days in California. Id.
134. 446 U.S. at 548-549. First, a DEA agent requested Mendenhall's permission for a
search of her purse and person. He informed her of her rights to refuse but she replied, "Go
ahead." The policewoman who was to perform the body search also asked Mendenhall if she
had consented to this intrusion. Mendenhall answered in the affirmative. Id.
135. 446 U.S. at 549. The District Court ruled that the agents' conduct was a permissi-
ble stop under Terry and Brignoni-Ponce, based on specific and articulable facts that justi-
fied a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
136. 446 U.S. at 547.
137. 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1979).
138. 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
139. 446 U.S. at 549-50.
140. 446 U.S. at 550.
141. 446 U.S. at 555, 560. In an opinion marked by concurrences in part, Stewart and
Rehnquist found that there had been no seizure of the respondent, thus no particularized
justification was required, while Powell, Blackmun, and Burger believed there to be suffi-
cient facts indicating that the agents had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was in-
volved in criminal activity. Id.
142. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1980).
143. 446 U.S. at 563-64.
144. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
1990
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sion of cocaine by the Georgia Court of Appeals. 45 DEA agents on
duty in the Atlanta airport observed Reid and a companion, both
of whom had just departed a Ft. Lauderdale flight with only carry-
on bags, leave the terminal in a manner suggesting they were try-
ing to hide the fact that they were traveling together. "6 One of the
agents briefly questioned Reid and his friend, then asked if they
would come to the DEA airport office. 47 Petitioner agreed but
soon bolted from the group, throwing off his shoulder bag before
he was caught. 4 " Petitioner sought to exclude the introduction at
trial of the cocaine found in this bag, claiming it had been ob-
tained through an unconstitutional seizure.14 The' trial court' 50
granted Reid's motion but the Court of Appeals reversed.' In a
per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that on the basis of the few drug courier characteristics exhibited
by Reid, no reasonable suspicion existed to justify his detention.'52
The opinion characterized the agents' belief that Reid was trying
to distance himself from his traveling companion as a mere
hunch, 15 3 but suggested that in some circumstances lawful behavior
could be used to reach a reasonable suspicion that a crime was in
progress. 154
Three years after Mendenhall and Reid, the Supreme Court is-
sued its opinion in Florida v. Royer.'55 County narcotics detectives
assigned to the Miami International Airport approached Royer and
asked him to produce his plane ticket and some identification, 56
after ascertaining that his "appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and
145. 448 U.S. at 441-42.
146. 448 U.S. at 439. Both parties carried identical shoulder bags and, though walking
apart separated by a few other passengers, kept exchanging glances. Id.
147. Id. The agent requested both to produce identification and tickets, which they
did. The tickets showed that the pair were in Ft. Lauderdale for just a day. Both petitioner
and his companion became very nervous during this period. Id.
148. Id.
149. 448 U.S. at 438.
150. Id. at 439.
151. State v. Reid, 149 Ga. App. 685, 255 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
152. 448 U.S. at 441. The four drug courier profile characteristics identified by the
Court were: arrival from Ft. Lauderdale, a principal source city for cocaine; arrival in the
early morning, when drug surveillance is presumed to be negligible; travel with only carryon
luggage; and companions apparently trying to conceal their identical travel plan. Id.
153. Id. The Court described this belief as "simply too slender a reed to support the
seizure in this case." Id.
154. Id.
155. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
156. 460 U.S. at 494.
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actions fit the so-called drug courier profile."' 57 Discovering that
respondent's ticket and luggage bore a name different than his
driver's license, the detectives identified themselves as narcotics
agents and told Royer they suspected him of transporting narcot-
ics.158 Without returning respondent's ticket or license, the detec-
tives asked him to come to a small room nearby.' 59 Royer did so.'6 °
The detectives had Royer's two pieces of luggage removed from his
intended flight and brought to the room, where they asked permis-
sion to open them.' Royer unlocked one bag and assented to the
breaking open of the second. 62 Marijuana was found in both
bags."'63 Royer's motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence was
denied, and he was convicted of felony possession of marijuana." 4
Reversing the conviction, the District Court of Appeal'6 5 held that
Royer's consent to the search was invalid because it was secured
while he was illegally detained. 6 6 The Court of Appeal determined
that the unlawful nature of Royer's detention came not from a lack
of reasonable suspicion but from the detectives surpassing the
"limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio.' '1 67 The Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.6 8 Acknowledging
that the drug courier profile was composed of characteristics
proven to be typical of drug traffickers,
9 the plurality opinion 170
157. Id. Royer appeared to be exhibiting the following six drug courier profile traits:
his luggage appeared to be unusually heavy; Royer appeared to be about 25-35 years old; he
was casually dressed; he seemed nervous and extremely watchful; his ticket was a cash
purchase from a large wad of bills; Royer wrote only the surname "Holt" and his destination
on the airline tag provided for his checked baggage. Id.
158. Id. Respondent proferred as an explanation for the name discrepancy that a
friend of his had made the reservations in his own name. Id.
159. Id. One of the detectives later described this room as a "large storage closet." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 460 U.S. at 494-495.
163. Id.
164. 460 U.S. at 495. The trial court found that Royer had freely consented to the
search of his luggage but, even if he hadn't, the warrantless search would have been reasona-
ble due to exigent circumstances. Id.
165. Florida v. Royer, 389 So. 2d 1007 (1980).
166. 389 So. 2d at 1015.
167. Royer, 460 U.S. at 495. The plurality opinion boldly asserts that, "we hold here
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Royer's luggage contained drugs."
Id.
168. 460 U.S. at 507.
169. 460 U.S. at 493 n.2 "The drug courier profile is an abstract of characteristics
found to be typical of persons transporting illegal drugs." Id.
170. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court, joined by Justices Marshall,
Powell and Stevens. Justice Brennan concurred in the result. 460 U.S. at 493, 508.
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tallied those drug courier characteristics displayed by Royer.'71
With the addition of the name discrepancy, the opinion concedes
that the detectives did have a reasonable basis for suspecting that
Royer was trafficking in drugs and so a brief investigatory stop was
justified.1 72 However, the Court believed that the boundaries of
this lawful detention had been overstepped when Royer's license
and ticket were not returned to him and his luggage was removed
from the plane without his knowledge or consent.1 7' Royer was not
free to leave; he was under arrest, even before the marijuana was
uncovered.17' The Court refused to find probable cause to arrest.
1 75
While the Royer decision stands as a strong warning to law en-
forcement officers not to transform a brief stop for investigation
into a forced interrogation or arrest, once again the Court vali-
dated the use of drug courier characteristics to provide grounds for
reasonable suspicion.
1 76
The last airport stop case heard by the Supreme Court prior to
its decision in Sokolow was Florida v. Rodriguez.177 Because of
their unusual behavior, respondent and two friends were spotted
by county narcotics officers at Miami International Airport.1 78 As
the officers followed the trio up an escalator, one of the three no-
ticed the plainclothes officers, who overheard him say twice to the
other two, "Let's get out of here.' 79 Rodriguez made a futile at-
tempt to flee.1 80 Identifying themselves, the officers requested the
trio to produce plane tickets and identification. 81 Two of the trio
171. 460 U.S. at 493.
172. 460 U.S. at 502. In the Court's words,
We agree with the State that when the officers discovered that Royer was traveling
under an assumed name, this fact, and the facts already known to the of-
ficers-paying cash for a one-way ticket, the mode of checking the two bags, and
Royer's appearance and conduct in general-were adequate grounds for suspecting
Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they
attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the
limits of an investigative detention.
Id.
173. 460 U.S. at 501.
174. 460 U.S. at 503. "As a practical matter, Royer was under arrest." Id.
175. 460 U.S. at 507.
176. 460 U.S. at 503. As described by the opinion, "What had begun as a consensual
inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interroga-
tion room ..." Id.
177. 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
178. 469 U.S. at 3.
179. 469 U.S. at 3-4.
180. 469 U.S. at 4. One of the officers described Rodriguez as "pumping" his legs up
and down but "not covering much ground." Id.
181. Id. Initially the officers just showed their badges to the trio. Id.
Recent Decisions
claimed to be the only "Rodriguez" named on the ticket, where-
upon the officers requested, and secured, permission to search re-
spondent's luggage. 18 2 Three bags of cocaine were found.18 3 The
Florida trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress, hold-
ing that not only was there no "articulable suspicion" to stop Rod-
riguez but that the consent to search was ineffective because the
officers failed to inform Rodriguez that he could walk away from
the questioning and that he could refuse to permit a search. 84 The
Florida Court of Appeals affirmed.1 85 Reaching down to reverse the
actions of the state courts, the Supreme Court castigated them for
failing to heed "the controlling principles of law governing airport
stops enunciated" in Mendenhall and Royer. 8' The per curiam
opinion held that there was reasonable suspicion to detain Rodri-
guez for questioning and that the search was consensual.1 8 7 Al-
though the phrase "drug courier profile" was not found in the
opinion, the Court took care to detail the various characteristics of
respondent and his friends which supported finding of reasonable
suspicion. 188 Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens objected primarily
because he saw this Court asuming an "error-correction" role for
state courts, a responsibility he did not believe it had. 8 9
Decided by the Supreme Court in the midst of this last series of
drug courier profile cases, United States v. Cortez'90 dealt with the
investigatory stop of a camper truck by the Border Patrol. 1 ' Piec-
ing together circumstantial evidence ranging from footprints to
travel times, border officers predicted that on the first clear week-
end night in late January 1977, a vehicle capable of transporting 8
to 20 people would travel west at approximately 4:00 a.m. on a lit-
182. Id. At this point the officers identified themselves specifically as narcotics officers.
Id.
183. Id.
184. 469 U.S. at 4-5. The trial court asserted that without notice of these rights, the
defendant's consent to search was "tainted." 469 U.S. at 5.
185. Id.
186. Id. Partially excusing the trial court because its ruling came before Mendenhall
and Royer were decided, the opinion denounced the Florida Court of Appeal's handling of
this case. Id.
187. 469 U.S. at 6.
188. 469 U.S. at 3-6. Such conduct as: paying cash in small bills for a plane ticket;
traveling under an alias; carrying all luggage; concealing that one is traveling with others;
attempting to evade law enforcement officers; traveling to or from a city notorious for its
drug trade; and displaying nervousness. These behavioral characteristics also just happen to
be present in drug courier profiles. Id.
189. 469 U.S. at 7.
190. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
191. Id. at 415-17.
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tle-used highway into the Arizona desert, pick up a group of illegal
aliens, and return.192 On the first such night, officers stopped the
only vehicle fitting that description and discovered six Mexican na-
tionals. 93 Convicted in the District Court,' respondent won a re-
versal in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 95 which held
that there were no specific and articulable facts to justify this stop,
just a number of "innocent inferences.'
' 96
Overruling the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court claimed
that the essence of reasonable suspicion analysis was that the "to-
tality of the circumstances" must be taken into account. 9 ' Infer-
ences and deductions as well as facts are to be considered in deter-
mining whether, in light of the whole picture, law enforcement
officers reasonably suspect that a crime was in progress.' Assert-
ing that-he process of arriving at a reasonable suspicion "does not
deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities,"' '9 9 the Court
noted that combining facts with deductions to prevent and solve
crime was exactly the sort of police work the criminal justice sys-
tem encouraged."' Cortez contributes a key principle to the Terry-
type stop analysis: reasonable suspicion is to be evaluated by look-
ing at the "totality of the circumstances." ''"1
In resolving the issues presented by Sokolow, it is imperative to
examine these two related lines of cases: the airport stop-drug cou-
rier profile cases and the scope of reasonable suspicion cases. Men-
denhall, Reid, Royer and Rodriquez make up the first group;
Terry, Adams, Brignoni-Ponce and Cortez constitute the second.
Andrew Sokolow contended throughout his disposition by the
courts that drug courier profile characteristics are not the "specific
and articulable facts" required to justify a brief investigatory
192. 449 U.S. at 413-415.
193. 449 U.S. at 415. Only two vehicles traveled that highway between the predicted
hours. Both were pickup trucks with camper shells but only one made the return trip-the
vehicle stopped by Border Patrol agents. Id.
194. 449 U.S. at 416. Respondent was found guilty of six counts of transporting illegal
aliens. His motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search was denied. Id.
195. Id.
196. 449 U.S. at 416.
197. 449 U.S. at 417.
198. 449 U.S. at 418.
199. Id.
200. 449 U.S. at 419. "We see here the kind of police work often suggested by judges
and scholars as examples of appropriate and reasonable means of law enforcement." Id.
201. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
at 15, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) (No. 87-1295).
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stop. 20 2 He argued that although the drug courier profile was a use-
ful tool to aid in the identification of drug traffickers, it was simply
a starting point for further investigation. 20 3 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit also discredited the use of drug courier pro-
file characteristics as a foundation for reasonable suspicion.2 4
Voicing concern that large numbers of innocent citizens would be
subject to seizure in the nation's airports if law enforcement of-
ficers looked only at personality traits in deciding whom to stop for
questioning, the Court announced its unprecedented two-part test
for reasonable suspicion. 20 5 The two lines of cases do not endorse
either of these views.
The four cases where the Supreme Court has specifically ad-
dressed the issue of whether drug courier profile traits can be used
to support a finding of reasonable suspicion are unanimous in
holding that they can. In Mendenhall, Reid, Royer and Rodriguez,
the government demonstrated that its officers had reasonably sus-
pected that the individuals stopped were transporting drugs solely
by enumerating various characteristics these individuals had in
common with the stereotypical drug courier. In every case but
Reid, the Supreme Court upheld the stop as constitutional. The
Court failed to be persuaded in Reid only because the government
offered so little evidence that Reid's behavior mirrored that of a
drug courier, not because the evidence consisted of drug courier
profile traits. These four cases from the early 1980's clearly estab-
lish that if an airline passenger exhibits a sufficient number of the
characteristics closely identified with drug traffickers to evoke a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, narcotics officers are free
to stop and question such a passenger.
Terry and its progeny set the constitutional parameters for a
brief investigatory stop and delineated what is to be considered in
a reasonable suspicion analysis. While creating a narrow exception
to the probable cause standard, the Terry Court sought to con-
tinue to safeguard individual privacy by demanding that law en-
forcement officers be able to muster "specific and articulable
202. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Brief in opposition, United States v. Sokolow, at 8, 27. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989)
(No. 87-1295).
203. Id. at 21-22.
204. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987).
205. Evidence of ongoing criminal activity must be joined with evidence of drug cou-
rier characteristics and the government must demonstrate that this resultant combination
does not describe significant numbers of those imperiled innocent travelers; this is reasona-
ble suspicion to the Court of Appeals.
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facts," along with the rational inferences therefrom, that would
lead a reasonable person to suspect that the individual detained
for questioning was involved in criminal activity.2 6 These particu-
larized facts and their natural inferences were to be taken from the
officer's personal observations and knowledge and considered in
light of his experience. 0 7 Adams expanded the basis for the spe-
cific and articulable facts by permitting them to be drawn from
any source carrying sufficient indicia of reliability, even the un-
checked tip of an informant. 08 The officer was no longer held to
what he had personally observed of the detainee; the officer could
act on information supplied by others. Pushing the door open even
wider, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce gave its imprimatur to the use
of any and all circumstantial evidence, 0 9 a category to which drug
courier profiles obviously belong. Eliminating any doubt that
might persist, the court in Cortez postulated that the particular-
ized facts specified for in Terry can be found anywhere in the "to-
tality of the circumstances."21
At no point in this exploration of the boundaries of a reasonable
suspicion analysis was there mention of a two-part test that must
be satisfied in order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion. To the
contrary, each case from Terry to Cortez decried dependence on
exacting requirements for reasonable suspicion and advocated in-
stead a generalized examination of the total circumstances of every
seizure."'
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sokolow was a predictable
and appropriate outcome in light of these prior cases. The Court
had consistently posited that reasonable suspicion determinations
should be based on common sense, not on legalized formulations,1 2
206. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
207. Id. at 27.
208. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
209. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
210. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
211. As Chief Justice Warren expounded in Terry, quoting from Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion which the search or
seizure entails." 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). Thirteen years later, Chief Justice Burger writing in
Cortez expressed similar sentiments when he discussed "the elusive concept of what cause is
sufficient to authorize police to stop a person." 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
212. As the majority opinion in Terry asserted, "focusing the inquiry squarely on the
dangers and demands of the particular situation seems more likely to produce rules which
are intelligible to the police and the public alike." 392 U.S. at 12. Elaborating on this theme
in Cortez, the Court explained, "Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as
such, practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as fact-finders are permitted to do the same - and so are law enforcement officers".
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such as the two-part test enunciated by the Court of Appeals be-
low. Since 1968, the decisions of the Supreme Court defining the
scope of reasonable suspicion analysis as the totality of the circum-
stances of each case, and permitting the use of drug courier profile
characteristics as specific and articulable facts in that analysis, un-
equivocally have contradicted the arguments of respondent and
the Court of Appeals.
Marshall's dissent and the divided panel of the Court of Appeals
which reversed Sokolow's initial conviction both emphasized the
peril, and invalidity, of including as part of a reasonable suspicion
analysis behavioral characteristics that might indicate innocent as
well as criminal conduct. However, as far back as Terry, the Su-
preme Court explicitly approved the use of "a series of acts, each
of them perhaps innocent in itself," but when viewed as a whole by
the experienced police officer would lead him to the reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.21 3 The Supreme Court
recognized in Illinois v. Gates214 that innocent behaviors can often
provide a basis for probable cause. The Gates opinion went on to
explain that, "the relevant inquiry is not whether particular con-
duct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that at-
taches to particular types of noncriminal acts." '215 Although the
Gates opinion was concerned With a determination of probable
cause, the same assertion as to the use of innocent behavior is true
of a determination of reasonable suspicion,2"' the matter at hand
in Sokolow. In a reasonable suspicion analysis, it is the totality of
the circumstances-the whole picture-which is considered in as-
sessing whether the law enforcement agent involved did reasonably
suspect that the individual detained was presently engaged in
criminal activity. Seemingly innocent acts can be part of this whole
picture, as can characteristics taken from a drug courier profile, so
long as law enforcement officers are able to demonstrate that all of
these factors amount to a reasonable suspicion. The Sokolow ma-
jority was correct in holding that the reasonable suspicion anaylsis
was not altered by the inclusion of drug courier profile characteris-
tics as factors leading to a reasonable suspicion.2"7
449 U.S. at 418.
213. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968).
214. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
215. 462 U.S. at 243-45.
216. 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
217. Rehnquist tersely states, "We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is
somehow changed by the agents' belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the
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Terry established the reasonable suspicion standard for brief in-
vestigatory stops as requiring that the police be able to demon-
strate, through the use of specific and articulable facts, that they
did reasonably suspect that the citizen was involved in criminal
activity at the time of detention. In applying this standard to the
airport stop, drug courier cases heard since 1980,18 the Supreme
Court has held fast to the Terry mandate. The Court has carefully
assessed whether the facts adduced as constituting reasonable sus-
picion do in fact add up to this legal requirement.2 19
The author has every expectation that the Court will continue to
demand that, whatever the origin of the specific and articulable
factors used by police in arriving at a decision to detain an individ-
ual for questioning, those factors must demonstrate a reasonable
suspicion when viewed as a whole. Further, considering the Presi-
dent's recently announced agenda for fighting drug abuse in the
United States, with 70 percent of the monies budgeted going to-
ward efforts to stop the flow of illicit drugs into the country,2 0 one
could expect that the use of drug courier profiles explicitly con-
doned by the. Sokolow Court for airport stops may be broadened
for street application as well.
Barbara J. Lorence
DEA's 'drug courier profiles'." 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989).
218. These cases are Royer, Reid, Mendenhall, Rodriquez, and Sokolow.
219. Not all detentions based on drug courier profiles have been upheld. In Reid, the
Supreme Court concluded that the few drug courier profile characteristics put forward did
not amount to reasonable suspicion. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
220. Morning Edition, National Public Radio, Broadcast of September 14, 1989.
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